BRYANT (DO NOT DELETE)

12/27/2020 9:21 PM

BRINGING DOWN THE DEAL: REEVALUATING THE DELAWARE
MAE STANDARD AFTER AKORN V. FRESENIUS
Katelyn E. Bryant*
I. INTRODUCTION
For better or for worse, public corporations keep combining.1
Successful mergers and acquisitions (M&A) brought us Whole Foods
discounts with Amazon Prime and cross-posting to Facebook and
Instagram.2 Through buying an airline ticket, renting a car, or grabbing
a beer, most people have recently interacted with companies that came
out ahead in an M&A transaction.3 While the combination process
seems to happen quickly, signing a contract is far from the final step.
Between executing an agreement and closing the deal, an enforceable
contract binds the parties.4 Therefore, contracts must address any
hazards that could threaten the target company before closing,
commonly known as deal risk.5 Parties frequently mitigate deal risk
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1 See generally Parks & Recreation: The Johnny Karate Super Awesome Musical
Explosion Show (NBC television broadcast Feb. 17, 2015) (announcing in a parody
advertisement that a Verizon-ExxonMobil-Chipotle merger yielded “Veroxxotle,” “proud
to be one of America’s 8 companies”).
2 Jeffrey Dorfman, Amazon and Whole Foods Merger to Introduce Cross-Platform
Selling and Lower Prices, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffrey
dorfman/2017/08/25/amazon-and-whole-foods-merger-to-introduce-cross-platformselling-and-lower-prices/#7e4de4e312f8; Why Instagram Is Worth $1B to Facebook,
FORTUNE (Apr. 10, 2012), https://fortune.com/2012/04/10/why-instagram-is-worth1b-to-facebook.
3 See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Corporate Consolidation (HBO
television broadcast Sept. 24, 2017).
4 Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses
in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2015 (2009). In public
company combinations, this interim period can extend for a year or more. Id. Common
sources of delay include due diligence, antitrust certifications, shareholder approvals,
and regulatory inquiries. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral
Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 335 (2005).
5 Miller, supra note 4, at 2013.
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through bring-down conditions.6 In a standard bring-down condition,
the seller first represents and warrants certain information that must
be true at signing.7 The seller then brings down, or reaffirms, those
representations and warranties when the buyer tenders the purchase
price.8
In so allocating deal risk,9 almost every10 merger agreement
includes a material adverse effect (MAE)11 clause to give teeth to the
bring-down conditions.12 If the seller cannot—or will not—rectify a
failed bring-down condition, which failure would reasonably be
expected to have an MAE, before any applicable cure period expires, the
buyer can invoke the MAE clause and refuse to close.13 Until 2017, there
was just one issue for parties who, like most,14 chose Delaware law: no
court had ever excused a buyer’s closing obligations due to an MAE.15

6

Id.
Miller, supra note 4, at 2036.
8 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, AG, No. 2018–0300–JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at
*145 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“[I]t is standard practice to . . . condition the buyer’s
obligation to close on the seller’s representations also being true at closing.”), aff’d en
banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS
OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, § 1.05[4], at 1–41 (2018 ed.); cf. Cobalt
Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., No. 714-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *89
(Del. Ch. Jul. 20, 2007) (“Due diligence is expensive and parties . . . often negotiate for
contractual representations that minimize a buyer’s need to verify every minute aspect
of a seller’s business.”).
9 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *113 n.530 (citing Miller, supra note 4, at 2013
n.7).
10 E.g., Andrew Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine
and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 818 (2010).
11 An alternate term, “material adverse change,” is essentially synonymous. Akorn,
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *111 n.524 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724
(Del. 2018); Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 331. But see Kenneth A. Adams, A LegalUsage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9,
10–11 (2004) (arguing that “material adverse change” affords greater clarity).
12 Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1153 (2013).
13 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *145–46; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at
§ 11.04[9].
14 More public companies incorporate in Delaware than in any other state. Faith
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2018). One possible explanation for this preference is that
“Delaware’s preeminence in corporate matters makes its court the standard by which
to judge all other such courts.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of
Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
15 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch.
2008); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd.,
No. 8980-VCG, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *63–64 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014)
(acknowledging that an MAE may have occurred but ruling on alternate grounds).
7
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This Comment will examine recent developments in Delaware MAE
precedent and the potential ramifications from those developments.
Part II will provide background information on MAE interpretation and
review the three seminal Delaware decisions which shaped the accepted
three-part MAE standard. Part III will analyze how the Delaware MAE
standard applied to the facts presented in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi
AG.16 Part IV will predict applications of the Akorn standard, focusing
specifically on how the quantitative and qualitative findings made in
that case may affect future MAE cases, alter the drafting process, and
shift interpretation bias. Part V will propose a new conduct/intent
standard for qualitative MAE analysis and argue that future decisions
should avoid biased interpretation. Finally, Part VI will conclude that
Delaware courts applying Akorn should specify a party-neutral
qualitative MAE standard.
II. DELAWARE PRECEDENT AND THE SELLER-FRIENDLY POLICY
Pre-2018 Delaware jurisprudence developed a three-part MAE test
and set forth a seller-friendly policy perspective to guide judicial review.
This Part briefly summarizes (A) background information that can
influence MAE interpretation, (B) IBP,17 the seminal Delaware MAE
case; (C) Frontier Oil,18 the second major MAE decision; (D) Hexion,19 the
third pivotal opinion; and (E) the aggregate resulting MAE standard.
A. Interpretational Considerations
The million-dollar question in any MAE case is what, exactly,
constitutes an MAE.20 As discussed at length in Section V.B. below,
narrow definitions rarely appear in contract language. Instead, parties
often agree to a vague materiality standard. Courts faced with MAE
claims must, therefore, decide whether parties meet that imprecise
standard. In other words, MAE opinions consider how material an
adverse effect must be before the buyer can walk away from the deal.

16 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, No. 2018–0300–JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
17 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
18 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr.
29, 2005).
19 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch.
2008).
20 See Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *126 (“It would be neither original nor
perceptive to observe that defining ‘Material Adverse Effect’ as a ‘material adverse
effect’ is not especially helpful.”).
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It is well established that material in this sense connotates a higher
bar than the standard used in typical contract interpretation.21 The
seminal Delaware MAE case adapted the federal securities regulation
standard by considering whether an omitted fact would have influenced
the decision-making process of a reasonable acquirer with the same
total mix of information.22 Later cases specified that materiality “varies
both with the context of the transaction and with the words chosen by
the parties.”23 Whatever the exact standard may be, materiality is a
question of fact.24 In making those factual findings, Delaware courts try
to approximate what the parties intended when signing the
agreement.25
The parties’ relative enthusiasm throughout the
transaction typically receives scrutiny,26 and post hoc MAE declarations
have produced consistently negative results for buyers.27 Put

21

See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 878. For example, factors toward determining
material breach of contract include:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the
injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that
benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances; [and] (e) the extent to which the behavior of
the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with
standards of good faith and fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
22 IBP, 789 A.2d at 63 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
23 Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *127; see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo
(Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *63–64 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 31, 2014) (demonstrating how context and circumstances shape MAE
definitions).
24 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *122; see Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1081
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Durning v. First Boston Corp. 815 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir.
1987)) (“[O]nly if the adequacy of the disclosure or the materiality of the statement is
‘so obvious that reasonable minds [could] not differ’ are these issues ‘appropriately
resolved as a matter of law.’”). But cf. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that a misrepresentation is immaterial as a matter of law if it falls
within common knowledge, concerns insignificant data, contains vague or hyperbolic
language, or is accompanied by satisfactory cautionary statements).
25 See, e.g., Mrs. Fields Brand, Inc. v. Interbake Foods LLC, No. 12201-CB, 2017 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 113, at *58 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2017).
26 See id. Courts frequently analyze informal statements, internal memos, meeting
minutes, and party recollections when questioning initial enthusiasm. See generally
Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 724–30 (Del. Ch. 2008).
This transactional timeline then considers when the buyer first suspected an MAE, the
frequency with which the buyer mentioned an MAE, and when the MAE was finally
claimed. See generally id.
27 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 356.
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differently, the question becomes whether the buyer genuinely believes
its own MAE claim, or whether it merely has buyer’s remorse.
In answering that question, commentators have described MAE
case law as inconsistent,28 counterintuitive,29 perplexing,30 incoherent,31
and downright scary.32 Extensive factual findings produce behemoth
opinions33 that frequently reach unpredictable conclusions.34 In preAkorn Delaware jurisprudence, three lower court decisions formed a
three-part MAE test that considers magnitude and duration35 through a
seller-friendly policy lens.36
B. In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
The seminal Delaware MAE decision concerned a merger between
buyer Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) and seller IBP, Inc. (IBP).37 Tyson and
IBP could barely contain their enthusiasm for the deal, and the kickoff
meeting went off so well that Tyson’s CEO asked deal counsel to begin
preparing an agreement right then and there.38 The merger agreement,
which was governed by New York law,39 included bring-down
conditions expressly warranting IBP’s financials40 and broadly

28 Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 846, 850 (2002).
29 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 825.
30 Galil, supra note 28, at 847.
31 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 825.
32 Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
219, 241 (2002) (statement of Richard Climan).
33 See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (246 pages), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); Hexion
Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008) (130 pages);
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005) (158 pages); In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del.
Ch. 2001) (190 pages).
34 Compare Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., No. 11365, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 194,
at *14–15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990) (50% decline in earnings over two consecutive quarters
likely to constitute MAE) with IBP, 789 A.2d at 69 (64% decrease in quarterly earnings,
not an MAE).
35 See Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 738.
36 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Id. at 30.
39 Id. at 52.
40 Id. at 41–43. IBP warranted that, as of the time of contract execution and through
deal closing, all statements filed with the SEC on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries
contained no untrue statements of material fact. Id. at 42.
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warranting against an MAE.41 Ten days after contract execution, Tyson
advisors learned that IBP had received a letter from the SEC raising
crucial issues with IBP’s prior year financial statements.42 Further,
during the subsequent fiscal quarter, an unusually harsh winter
financially impacted both Tyson and IBP, with IBP’s losses totaling
roughly 64% of its standalone value.43 Tyson nevertheless expressed its
continued commitment to the deal.44 But when Tyson’s enthusiasm
waned, the deal essentially imploded. Following a disappointing
quarter of its own, Tyson decided not to proceed with the merger45 and
unilaterally terminated the agreement.46 In resulting litigation, Tyson
asserted that IBP’s failed bring-down conditions had caused an MAE and
excused Tyson’s obligation to close.47
From the start, the court viewed Tyson’s MAE claim suspiciously.
Tyson had not even considered declaring an MAE before terminating the
merger,48 and the court preliminarily concluded that Tyson would not
have considered a short-term drop in IBP’s performance to be material
when it signed the merger agreement.49 The court went on to consider
MAE declarations conceptually, arriving at the oft-quoted conclusion
that
the important thing is whether the company has suffered a[n]
[MAE] in its business or results of operations that is
consequential to the company’s earnings power over a
commercially reasonable period, which one would think
would be measured in years rather than months. It is odd to
think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip in
earnings as material, so long as the target’s earnings-

41 Id. at 42–43. The bring-down condition stated that IBP had not suffered “any
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or
reasonably could be expected to have a[n] [MAE].” Id.
42 IBP, 789 A.2d at 43–44.
43 Id. at 47–48, 69.
44 Id. at 48.
45 Id. at 50. The decision came down from a secretive March 28, 2001, meeting of
former executives known as the “old guard,” including the CEO’s father. Id. Thenpresent Tyson officials claimed that, prior to that meeting, they thought the deal was
going forward. Id.
46 Id. at 50–51. The termination letter sent from Tyson to IBP contained no
allegations of, or references to, IBP having suffered an MAE. Id. at 51.
47 Id. at 52–53. As previously mentioned, the merger agreement was governed by
New York law. Id. at 52. Applying that choice of law, the court found that Tyson bore
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that IBP had sustained an MAE.
Id. at 52–54.
48 IBP, 789 A.2d at 65.
49 Id.
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generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or
the blip’s cause.50
The court further considered “the longer-term perspective of a
reasonable acquiror” when determining what Tyson had understood
the contract to mean.51 One abysmal quarter, the court reasoned, did
not meet the materiality threshold because that disappointing quarter
did not significantly inhibit IBP’s long-term earnings potential.52
The decision also weighed a policy question: who should bear the
burden of deal risk?53 The court reasoned that broad MAE definitions
are “best read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence
of unknown events that substantially threaten the overall earnings
potential of the target in a durationally significant manner.”54 Under
that seller-friendly policy perspective, Tyson failed to prove that IBP
had suffered an MAE.55 But this policy decision sparked debate among
commentators who asked whether that interpretation reflected realistic
expectations.56
C. Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.
Three years later, the court revisited IBP in Frontier Oil.57 This case
concerned a long-anticipated58 consolidation of Frontier Oil
Corporation (Frontier) and Holly Corporation (Holly).59 During
negotiations, Frontier learned that its wholly-owned subsidiary faced
possible mass tort litigation spearheaded by none other than Erin
Brockovich.60 Accordingly, Holly insisted that stronger language,
50

Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
52 Id. at 67 (characterizing IBP as “consistently profitable, but subject to strong
[financial] swings”).
53 Id. at 68.
54 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68.
55 Id. at 71. Then-Vice Chancellor Strine noted that the outcome would have been
reversed if IBP had borne the burden of proving, to a clear and convincing standard, that
an MAE had not occurred. Id. at 72 n.172.
56 See Molly Brooks, The “Seller-friendly” Approach to MAC Clause Analysis Should Be
Replaced by a “Reality-friendly” Approach, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 83, 84 (2010); see also
Galil, supra note 28, at 865; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 831; Sherri L. Taub, Note,
“Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC Clauses in a Post-IBP Environment, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 896–97 (2003).
57 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *127 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
58 The companies had informally discussed a consolidation for several years, with
Frontier’s CEO predicting that the combination would create “one incredible company.”
Id. at *3.
59 Id. at *2.
60 Id. at *7–8.
51
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including a specific MAE bring-down condition,61 be added to the
consolidation agreement.62 Shortly after contract execution, the
threatened litigation materialized—with Frontier named as a direct
defendant.63 Protracted restructuring efforts ultimately failed during a
heated conference call with a seeming eye toward litigation.64 Frontier
filed suit the next day, alleging that Holly had repudiated the
agreement65 and effectively precluded Holly from declaring an MAE.66
Holly vehemently denied any such repudiation and counterclaimed that,
in breach of Frontier’s bring-down conditions, the mass tort litigation
would reasonably be expected to have an MAE on Frontier.67
The court first adopted IBP as the rule under Delaware law,
describing the standard as affording protection from “unknown (or
undisclosed) factors that would justify an exit from the transaction.”68
The opinion acknowledged that future events could cause a present
MAE69 but emphasized that there must be some “basis in law and fact
for the serious adverse consequences prophesied by the party claiming
the MAE.”70 That basis, the court held, must be supported by objective
qualitative and quantitative evidence.71 In other words, Holly’s
61

Id. at *13–16.
Id. The agreement defined an MAE, with respect to either party, as “a material
adverse effect with respect to (A) the business, assets and liabilities (taken together),
results of operations, condition (financial or otherwise) or prospects of a party and its
Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.” Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *16
(emphasis in original).
63 Id. at *38–40. Newly discovered documents indicated that Frontier had indeed
contracted to indemnify that subsidiary. Id. at *45–46. Frontier had not known about
the indemnities before signing the agreement; upon discovery, it was less than
forthcoming with the information. Id. at *49.
64 Id. at *59. Frontier’s CEO asked whether Holly was rescinding the contract, to
which he “clearly, unambiguously, directly, and unequivocally responded[,] ‘No.’” Id. at
*81–82. The court accepted Holly’s protest that Frontier’s CEO, a “straight-talking, bootwearing Texan who does not speak legalese[,]” would not have used such language
independently. Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *84. Unfortunately, the opinion
did not suggest what language that CEO would conceivably have used.
65 Id. at *86.
66 Id. at *105.
67 Id. at *89, *94–95.
68 Id. at *128–29. The court conceded that Frontier may have breached the warranty
against threatened litigation but emphasized that mere breach of warranty, absent a
showing that such breach would reasonably be expected to have an MAE, did not sustain
Holly’s claim. Id. at *131.
69 Contra S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. DowBrands, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670 (D.
Del. 2001) (“The sole decision by a third party to bring a lawsuit does not bring about
any change in the company’s assets, unless and until a court adjudicates the claim in
favor of the third party . . . .”).
70 Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *137 n.224.
71 Id. at *142.
62
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predictions could excuse its closing obligations if, but only if, Holly
produced concrete facts suggesting that the mass tort litigation would
end badly for Frontier. Ultimately, Holly did not prove those facts and
failed on its MAE claim.72 First, a finding for the mass tort plaintiffs was
not guaranteed, and a judgment arising from any such finding was
similarly unpredictable.73 Further, Holly presented no expert opinions
supporting its prediction that Frontier would lose the mass tort
litigation.74 Absent legal and factual evidence, the court found Holly’s
MAE declaration overly speculative and without merit.75
D. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.
This case concerned an acquisition of Huntsman Corporation
(Huntsman) by Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (Hexion).76 Hexion’s
winning bid for Huntsman ousted a competitor with whom Huntsman
had already contracted,77 so Huntsman enjoyed significant bargaining
power.78 That advantage produced final terms so favorable to
Huntsman that the MAE clause formed Hexion’s only practicable escape
hatch.79 The parties also agreed to uncapped damages should Hexion
knowingly or intentionally80 breach any contract term, and $325 million
in liquidated damages for any other breach.81 In other words, if Hexion
decided to jump ship, it would be on the hook for at least $325 million—
unless it could prove an MAE. So, Hexion was in a tough spot when
Huntsman’s first-quarter financial reports significantly missed

72

Id. at *136–37.
Id. at *136.
74 Id. The court speculated that this lack of expert testimony was not surprising
since “[i]t might not be in Holly’s self-interest, as a participant in the petroleum industry,
to champion the cause of linking exposure to petroleum (or petroleum products) to
cancer.” Id. at *136 n.221.
75 Id. at *143.
76 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del Ch. 2008).
Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Hexion’s parent company, began acquisition negotiations with
Huntsman in late 2005. Id. at 723. After substantial due diligence, Apollo abandoned
the 2005 negotiations when Huntsman missed income projections. Id.
77 Id. at 724. Hexion initially showed tremendous enthusiasm for the Huntsman
deal. Id. at 724–25.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 736–37. That clause narrowly carved out exceptions for economic and
industry conditions. Id.
80 The court acknowledged that “knowingly” and “intentionally” are not terms
typically used in contract law, but held that a “‘knowing and intentional’ breach . . . is the
taking of a deliberate act, which act constitutes in and of itself a breach of the merger
agreement, even if breaching was not the conscious object of the act.” Id. at 747–48.
81 Id. at 724.
73
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projections.82 Without notifying Huntsman, Hexion obtained and
published an opinion stating that the combined company would be
insolvent.83 Concurrently, Hexion filed suit for a declaratory judgment
that Huntsman had suffered an MAE.84
The Hexion court, relying on IBP and Frontier Oil, stressed the
heavy burden assumed by buyers who cry MAE.85 The court held that
the party seeking to avoid performance under an MAE claim bears the
burden of proof86 and established the presumption that a buyer is
purchasing a target company for long-term investment value.87 The
court noted that while a severe decline in the target’s earnings may be
an MAE, any such decline “must be expected to persist significantly into
the future.”88 The evidence in this case showed that Huntsman’s
financial decline affected only two divisions of the company, which had
been expected to generate a mere 25% of Huntsman’s annual earnings
before income tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).89
Moreover, the court looked critically at Hexion’s prepared insolvency
opinion and found its credibility lacking.90 Yet again, apparent buyer’s
remorse could not overcome the seller-friendly policy, and Hexion’s
MAE claim met a familiar demise.
E. Aggregating the Pre-Akorn Standard
Taken together, IBP, Frontier Oil, and Hexion solidified the
Delaware MAE standard. IBP established the seller-friendly policy91 and
treated a broad MAE condition as a backstop such that the buyer gained
protection from (i) unknown events (ii) which substantially threaten
the target’s overall earnings potential (iii) in a durationally significant
way.92 Frontier Oil posited that contemplated future effects with some
basis in law and fact might constitute a present MAE.93 Finally, Hexion
82 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 725 n.8. According to those reports, the 27% to 32% returns
expected by Hexion had fallen to between 11% and 18%. Id.
83 Id. at 725. Although Hexion had no right to terminate the merger agreement for
insolvency, it sought to frustrate financing and indirectly terminate the deal by
publishing the insolvency opinion. Id. at 725–26.
84 Id. at 736.
85 Id. at 738.
86 Id. at 739.
87 Id. at 738.
88 Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 738.
89 Id. at 744–45.
90 Id. at 727.
91 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
92 Id.
93 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *137 n.224
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
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established that the buyer presumptively bears the burden of proof94
and that any negative financial projection relied upon to show an MAE
must be reasonably expected to negatively affect the target’s long-term
future performance.95
As these cases demonstrate, the burden of disproving buyer’s
remorse is so massive that “[a] contractual [MAE] is like a Delaware
tornado—frequently alleged but rarely shown to exist.”96 This approach
conforms with Delaware’s particular respect for contractarian theory97
and sends a clear message: if a buyer wants an easier out, it should
contract for one. But commentators criticized Delaware’s uniformly
seller-friendly record, finding that the standard deprived buyers of what
was already in the contract: their bargained-for right to declare an
MAE.98
III. CASE STUDY: AKORN, INC. V. FRESENIUS KABI AG
Ten years after Hexion, one Delaware opinion did the unthinkable
by finding a seller who had, indeed, suffered an MAE so severe that it
excused the buyer’s closing obligations.99 This Part explores (A) the
case’s factual background, including pre-signing conduct, specific bringdown conditions, and post-signing developments; (B) the court’s
findings that the seller had suffered an MAE under qualitative and
quantitative thresholds; and (C) the opinion’s affirmation on appeal.

94

Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 739.
Id. at 742–43.
96 Chyronhego Corp. v. Wight, No. 2017-0548-SG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 258, at *22
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2018).
97 See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325,
at *139 n.622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (noting that Delaware law “is more contractarian
than that of many other states”), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); see also Ev3,
Inc. v. Lesh, 103 A.3d 179, 181 n.3 (Del. 2014) (“Delaware courts seek to ensure freedom
of contract and promote clarity in the law in order to facilitate commerce.”); Libeau v.
Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. 2005) (“When parties have ordered their affairs
voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to respect their
agreement[.]”), rev’d on other grounds, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006); cf. Milford Power Co.
v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738, 748 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Many sophisticated
parties . . . sign contracts that have terms that might be considered onerous; [Delaware]
law does not relieve them of the burden of those decisions simply because of their afterthe-fact regrets.”).
98 Brooks, supra note 56, at 84; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 828.
99 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *193.
95
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A. Factual Background
The court’s 246-page opinion incorporates extensive factual
findings.100 This Section will address those findings in three parts: (1)
the parties’ pre-signing conduct, (2) the terms of the agreement, and (3)
subsequent events leading up to Fresenius’ MAE declaration.
1. Pre-Signing Conduct
This case involved a failed pharmaceutical merger between buyer
Fresenius Kabi AG (Fresenius) and seller Akorn, Inc. (Akorn).101 Akorn
approached Fresenius in late 2016 to propose a merger.102 The parties
entered into two confidentiality agreements in November 2016 under
which Fresenius conducted due diligence.103 Fresenius made its initial
bid shortly thereafter; Akorn turned down that bid and stated that
Fresenius could not conduct full due diligence unless the company
improved its bid.104 Following an improved bid in February 2017,
Fresenius gained access to Akorn’s data room and conducted extensive
due diligence regarding Akorn’s regulatory compliance records.105
Based on that investigation, the Fresenius board approved an additional
bid increase after receiving a management presentation that identified
risk factors such as product launch delays and necessary capital
expenditures; this presentation, however, identified no data integrity
risks.106
2. Applicable Bring-Down Conditions
The parties executed the final merger agreement on April 24,
2017.107 That agreement defined an MAE in the traditional—though
convoluted—terms as
any effect, change, event or occurrence that, individually or in
the aggregate (i) would prevent or materially delay, interfere
with, impair or hinder the consummation of the [Merger] or
the compliance by [Akorn] with its obligations under this
100 See id. To prevent exceeding the opinion’s length, this Comment discusses only
those facts relevant to the failed bring-down conditions.
101 Id. at *6–7. Fresenius, a German corporation, and Akorn, a Louisiana corporation,
chose Delaware law to govern the merger agreement. Id. at *15 n.14.
102 Id. at *34–35.
103 Id. at *36.
104 Id. at *37–38. The first confidentiality agreement addressed due diligence
generally. Id. at 36. The second confidentiality agreement granted access to competitive
information with possible antitrust implications. Id.
105 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *40.
106 Id. at *42–43.
107 Id. at *43.
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Agreement or (ii) has a material adverse effect on the
business, results of operations or financial condition of the
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole . . . .108
In the agreement’s bring-down conditions, Akorn represented that (i) it
complied with all applicable FDA regulations; (ii) it complied with all
contemporary good manufacturing practices; (iii) its tests and studies
had all been conducted within that compliance status; (iv) it had made
neither fraudulent statements nor false or misleading statements of
material fact to the FDA; and (v) all drug proposals previously submitted
for FDA approval had been accurate, complete, and correct.109 As is
customary, Akorn warranted that each of those representations would
remain true and correct through closing.110 Any deviation from Akorn’s
as-represented conditions granted Fresenius the right to terminate the
merger agreement if that deviation would reasonably be expected to
constitute an MAE.111
3. Post-Signing Conduct
Between October 2017 and January 2018, while awaiting antitrust
approval, Fresenius received three whistleblower letters concerning
Akorn’s compliance with FDA data integrity regulations.112 When
Fresenius investigated those concerns, it learned that (i) the data
integrity systems used in Akorn’s manufacturing process deviated
significantly from FDA standards;113 (ii) Akorn’s data integrity systems
contained numerous fundamental flaws that jeopardized its FDA
compliance;114 (iii) these flaws permitted Akorn employees to enter
noncompliant tests and studies;115 and (iv) prior drug proposals
submitted for FDA approval had contained false, incomplete, and
incorrect data sets.116 Fresenius also forwarded the whistleblower
letters to authorities.117 When Akorn met with the FDA in March 2018
to address the letters, company representatives made statements that
Fresenius later alleged to have been misleading or knowingly false.118
108

Id. at *115 (first alteration in original).
Id. at *44.
110 Id.
111 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *45.
112 Id. at *63, *71.
113 Id. at *153.
114 Id.
115 Id. at *159–60.
116 Id. at *156–57.
117 See Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *78.
118 Id. at *87. On receiving a copy of the meeting minutes, Fresenius’s deal counsel
sent a strongly worded letter accusing Akorn of making “false, incomplete and
109
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At a board meeting on April 17, 2018, Fresenius learned that the
costs of remediating FDA noncompliance devalued Akorn’s equity by an
estimated 37%.119 In response, Fresenius asserted that Akorn was in
breach of its warranties and extended an opportunity for Akorn to
respond or otherwise refute the claim;120 Akorn declined that offer.121
Thereafter, Fresenius notified Akorn on April 22, 2018, that Fresenius
was terminating the merger because, among other things, the failed
bring-down conditions were reasonably likely to cause an MAE.122
Akorn immediately filed suit, alleging that Fresenius wrongfully
terminated the merger agreement.123
B. Holdings
The court analyzed whether the “deviation between Akorn’s asrepresented condition and its actual condition was so great that it would
reasonably be expected to result in a[n] [MAE].”124 Applying Frontier
Oil, the court looked objectively at whether there was some basis in law
and fact for Fresenius’s assertion.125 This Section considers how the
court addressed (1) qualitative factors and (2) quantitative factors in
reaching its conclusion.
1. Qualitative Factors
Beginning with the qualitative factors, the court concluded that
overwhelming evidence supported Fresenius’s MAE assertion.126 Data
integrity violations concerning essential aspects of Akorn’s business
existed in its systems at the time that Akorn made its representations.127
Following the merger agreement, Akorn made no effort to remedy these
failures, which increased in frequency and severity.128 That increase
could be traced back to employee misconduct, including falsified FDA

misleading” statements to the FDA, thereby violating the fifth warranty condition. Id. at
*88.
119 Id. at *89–90.
120 Id. at *90–91.
121 Id. at *91.
122 Id.
123 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *7.
124 Id. at *7. Following Hexion, Fresenius bore the burden of proving that Akorn’s
failed bring-down conditions would be reasonably likely to cause an MAE. Id. at *145.
The court first ruled that Fresenius had proven deviations from the as-represented
condition. Id. at *7.
125 Id. at *151.
126 Id.
127 Id. at *153.
128 Id. at *152, *154.
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submissions and management oversight neglect.129
Fresenius
supported these assertions with credible expert testimony, which the
court accepted as suggesting a qualitative MAE from Akorn’s failed
bring-down condition.130
The court also weighed Akorn’s dramatic shift in claimed
regulatory compliance.131 In May 2018, the FDA began an investigation
into Akorn’s facilities to evaluate the nature and severity of the
whistleblower accusations.132 During the late-stage FDA investigation,
someone at Akorn erased a product-specific electronic database,
together with its local backup file and related security logs, ostensibly
to conceal further damaging data from the FDA.133 Because Akorn’s
products required consistent, accurate, and reliable data, the court
found that these systemic failures called into question the reliability of
all company data; those questions meant that Akorn could not operate
at all until it remedied the data integrity issues.134 The court concluded
that this necessary suspension in operations, brought about by “a
disastrous culture of noncompliance[,]” constituted an essential failure
of Akorn’s MAE bring-down condition.135
2. Quantitative Factors
Turning to the quantitative elements, the court weighed the
projected remediation costs and the resulting impact on deal value, and
whether that impact would have been considered material by the
parties at contract execution.136 The parties’ respective experts
presented starkly conflicting projections as to remediation costs,137 but
the court rejected both estimates, determining that the actual
remediation cost probably fell somewhere between those figures.138
Taken alongside the deal price, the court’s accepted remediation costs

129

Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *155–57.
Id. at *159–61.
131 See id. at *165.
132 Id. at *94–95.
133 Id. at *164–65.
134 See id. at *165.
135 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *165–66.
136 Id. at *165–66.
137 Id. at *166. Fresenius anticipated that the regulatory violations were significantly
more severe than had been detected in due diligence and, therefore, projected a
remediation cost which represented the worst-case scenario. Id. at *168–71. By
contrast, Akorn’s expert predicted that no further compliance issues would be detected
on subsequent audits and estimated remediation expenses for only those violations
identified during due diligence. Id. at *166–68.
138 Id. at *172.
130
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devalued the transaction by 21% of Akorn’s total equity value.139
Problematically, the record contained no evidence concerning the
parties’ subjective expectations or industry standards to indicate
whether a 20% decrease in equity value would be material.140
Relying on his intuition, the Vice Chancellor ultimately determined
that a 20% decrease in overall value met the quantitative materiality
threshold.141 In cross-checking this intuition, the Vice Chancellor
considered four indicators suggesting that a 20% loss in total value
would be considered material to a reasonable acquiror.142 First, a 20%
drop in stock prices creates a bear market.143 Second, in renegotiations,
after one party declares an MAE, the average buyer demands a 15%
reduction from the original deal price.144 Third, in stock consideration
deals, parties generally set upper and lower collar bounds between 10%
and 20%.145 Finally, reverse termination fees146 average at about 6% of
the total transaction value.147 For those reasons, the court found that
the quantitative factors supported Fresenius’s MAE assertions and,

139

Id.
Id. at *172–73.
141 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *173.
142 Id. at *174.
143 Id. That the public recognizes a term for that specific threshold, the court
reasoned, indicates a broad cultural acceptance that this decrease is material. Id. at
*175.
144 Id. at *175. This average price reduction suggested that a 20% decrease in the
target company’s total equity value would be material to a reasonable buyer. Id.
145 Id. at *175–76. The court found that even those these numbers represent a noisy
proxy, which is usually accompanied by an additional MAE clause, the fact that parties
generally renegotiate after a 10% loss indicates that parties would find a 20% loss
material. Id. at *177. For a discussion of collars as a renegotiation tactic, see Micah S.
Officer, Collars and Renegotiation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 59 J. FIN. 2719 (Dec. 2004).
146 Reverse termination fees, another buyer protection term commonly included in
merger agreements, become payable by the buyer to the seller following a merger
agreement termination caused by specific triggering events such as regulatory/antitrust
approval, financing contingencies, and representation and warranty conditions. Bryan
JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 809, 812 (2010). For
a comparison study between reverse termination fees and MAE clauses, see Gilson &
Schwartz, supra note 4.
147 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *177–78 (citing Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken
Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 593–94
(2015)). Noting that reverse termination fees mark another noisy proxy and that
reverse termination fees essentially establish an option, the court nonetheless found
that a 20% loss in value, which far exceeds the average 6% reverse termination fee,
would likely be material to a reasonable buyer. Id.
140
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together with the qualitative factors, excused Fresenius’s closing
obligations.148
C. Appeal
Chief Justice Strine, writing for a unanimous Delaware Supreme
Court, affirmed the lower court in a three-page opinion.149 Commending
the Court of Chancery for its extensive fact findings and well-supported
conclusions, the Supreme Court found “no need . . . to comment upon or
to address [that] reasoning”150 and accepted that Akorn had suffered an
MAE so severe that Fresenius no longer bore its closing obligations.151
IV. THE POST-AKORN DELAWARE MAE STANDARD
This Part considers the complications that Akorn may impose on
Delaware MAE jurisprudence, namely (A) the qualitative and
quantitative thresholds applied, (B) changes to the drafting process
caused by the framework provided, and (C) the shifting interpretation
bias.
A. Qualitative and Quantitative Thresholds
Akorn’s percentage quasi-threshold152 for quantitative significance
marks the only numeric data point at which Delaware courts have found
an MAE, but the opinion’s analysis of non-numeric qualitative factors
affords significantly less guidance. Given the formulaic standard,153 it is
not hard to imagine how the Akorn standard might fall too far from the
tree.

148 Id. at *166, *178. The court posited in a footnote that the findings were casespecific and that the percentages should not be interpreted as a bright-line rule. Id. at
*173 n.740.
149 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018) (en banc).
150 Id. at 724 n.5. Notably, Chief Justice Strine decided IBP and implemented the
seller-friendly policy perspective while sitting as a Vice Chancellor. In re IBP, Inc.
S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
151 Akorn, 198 A.3d 724, 724 n.5 (Del. 2018) (en banc).
152 Richard W. Slack & Joshua M. Glasser, The Material Adverse Effect Landscape after
Akorn v. Fresenius, 15 PRATT’S J. OF BANKR. L. 29, 39 (Jan. 2019).
153 See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at § 11.09 (“[T]he Akorn opinion provides a clear
methodology for evaluating the magnitude of a given effect and an approach for
assessing its durational significance.”).
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1. The Quantitative Quasi-Bright-Line Rule
The decision’s reliance on a 40% materiality benchmark supports
the assertion that any decline exceeding that level will be deemed
material;154 this approach has since found support in subsequent
decisions.155
Moreover, notwithstanding the opinion’s footnote
admonishment,156 it is likely that parties will now evaluate MAE claims
against the decision’s percentage benchmark because Akorn’s 20%
decrease in equity value represents the only data point in Delaware MAE
jurisprudence.157 Such reliance may well prove problematic because, as
the opinion acknowledges,158 each of the four justifications for that
threshold oversimplifies materiality.
The decision first justifies the 20% materiality threshold by
comparison with how the public perceives bear markets.159 Of the four
comparisons considered in the decision, this corollary comes closest to
reflecting the party intent analysis emphasized in other decisions.
Applying broad cultural understanding, however, clashes with the
inherently fact-specific nature of an MAE. Moreover, this analogy does
not account for the positional differences between strategic buyers and
short-term investors.160 A one-quarter earnings decline—like one that
may occur during a bear market—might well be material to a short-term
investor;161 that same one-quarter earnings decline is less likely to be
material to a strategic buyer seeking long-term earnings potential.162
Because the bear market analogy groups those two types of buyers

154 Id. (“[M]ost cases that have considered decreases in profits in the 40% or higher
range found a [MAE] to have occurred.”).
155 Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1394, at *86 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
156 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at
*173 n.740 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
157 Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39 (“Future cases will likely test whether an
over-20% valuation hit automatically counts as qualitatively significant . . . .”); see Adam
O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, The MAC Is Back: Material Adverse Change Provisions
after Akorn, THE INT’L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (2019), at 5 (“A 20%
decrease in the value of the seller may constitute a MAC.”).
158 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *178 (“I do not pretend that any of these
indicators is directly on point.”).
159 Id. at *174.
160 See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 67–68 (Del. Ch.
2001) (distinguishing what would be material to a strategic buyer from what would be
material to a speculative investor).
161 Id. at 67.
162 Id.
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together, it deviates from the well-established nuance underlying MAE
declarations.163
Other data points provided in the opinion adhere more closely to
the accepted materiality principles but may ultimately set the threshold
even lower than 20%. Where a decline in equity value reaches only
15%, for example, the buyer may now argue that this drop represents
what the parties might have agreed upon in subsequent renegotiations.
And in stock-for-stock deals, parties who do not bargain for collars may
nonetheless invoke the decision’s materiality justification for a 10%
decline in value—which would typically trigger a significant price
change164—to demonstrate why a similar decline constitutes an MAE.
The discussion of reverse termination fees provides an even lower data
point, reasoning that a decline in value of more than 6% would cause
the buyer to consider paying the reverse termination fee to avoid more
significant long-term losses.165 These data points suggest, troublingly,
that a particular numeric value may apply even where parties fail to set
a deal-specific threshold.
At least one subsequent opinion has reinforced that there is no
sanctioned bright-line rule for what constitutes a quantitative MAE.166
That opinion, however, also weighed the facts presented against the
20% materiality benchmark used in Akorn.167 This treatment suggests
that, given credible supporting evidence, Delaware courts may be
willing to follow the Akorn materiality benchmark.168 But it remains to
be seen whether the 20% threshold will create false positives169—or

163 Subsequent opinions have further consolidated those positions into a “reasonable
investor/acquiror” label. See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 20180673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
164 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *175–76.
165 Id. at *177–78.
166 Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *86.
167 Id.
168 See Glenn West et al., Just Because a Really Bad Thing Happens Does Not Mean a
Material Adverse Effect Has Occurred: Assessing the Latest Delaware MAE Decision, WEIL,
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (Dec. 24, 2019) https://www.weil.com/~/media/mailings/
2019/q1/channel-medsystems_clean-revision-4.pdf (“The Chancellor’s highlighting of
these benchmarks suggests that parties . . . consider whether they can demonstrate a
decline of at least 20% before asserting [an] MAE.”) (emphasis in original).
169 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 889 (2010) (defining false positives as
“circumstances in which the proxy condition is violated, but the parties would not intend
to excuse the buyer”).
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false negatives170—where parties assert that a decrease in equity value
is sufficiently material.171
2. The Qualitative Threshold
An additional complication to the quasi-threshold is that the MAE
test for failed bring-down conditions balances quantitative factors
against qualitative factors.172 While the Akorn decision provides
significant guidance toward quantification,173 the qualitative materiality
analysis affords much less clarity.
The qualitative analysis may turn on whether the buyer has
presented overwhelming evidence showing an essential failure in the
target business.174 Qualifying the failure as essential suggests that,
absent evidence meeting the numeric thresholds, the target business
must have sustained such extreme damage that the transaction’s
principal purpose has been irreparably frustrated.175 An essential
failure standard would, therefore, expand upon the common law
doctrine of frustration of purpose.176 Alternatively, the qualitative test
may examine the context to determine whether the purposes of the
contract have been, or are reasonably likely to be, materially impaired.
Systemic effects that would likely continue, worsen, or spread across the
target business might certainly impair a company such that the
transaction is materially frustrated.
In that sense, qualitative
considerations seemingly include primary as well as secondary
purposes, and whether those purposes will collide because of the
adverse effect.177 Until future decisions shed light on the qualitative
treatment applied in Akorn, this element remains an unclear aspect of
the MAE framework.

170 See id. (defining false negatives as “circumstances in which the condition is not
violated, but the parties would want to excuse the buyer in order to achieve the
contracting goals of efficient investment or signaling”).
171 See Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39; West et al., supra note 168, at 2.
172 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *150–51 (Del. Ch. Oct.
1, 2018) (quoting Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *36 n.224
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005)), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
173 See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at § 11.09.
174 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *151–52.
175 See Genesco, Inc. v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III), 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1, at
*53–55 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007); Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc.,
No. 98-2441, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31529, at *16 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (per curiam); see
also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 830–31.
176 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 830–31.
177 See Genesco, 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *16–19 (contextualizing primary and
secondary failures to find an MAE).
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B. Drafting Changes
Combination agreements require extensive artisanal drafting to
reflect the unique facts and circumstances surrounding each
transaction.178 That significant customization leaves many agreement
terms, including bring-down conditions, open for negotiation.179
Moreover, the high stakes place MAE conditions among the most heavily
negotiated merger terms.180 Targets prefer narrow language with fewer
exceptions to the buyer’s closing obligations,181 whereas buyers prefer
broad language, which affords more flexibility to walk away.182 Because
parties can rarely agree to precise terms, merger agreements typically
include vague language and do not define what would be considered
material to the transaction.183 This drafting technique limits the risk of
potentially overbroad or underinclusive language.184 Deliberately
vague terms also reduce drafting costs which would otherwise be
incurred by attempting to foresee all possible scenarios.185 But
intentional ambiguity effectively delegates interpretation to courts
should the transaction go south.186 The associated juridical risk187 can
dilute these strategic decisions because MAE interpretations
notoriously defy consistency.188
178 Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A Agreements: A
Response to Choi, Gulati & Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 219, 226 (Jan. 2019) (finding that
“over half of the text of merger agreements is routinely rewritten from one deal to the
next”).
179 Brooks, supra note 56, at 86.
180 Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 853; Miller, supra note 4, at 2012.
181 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 822.
182 Id.
183 Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 883; see Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions
of Public Companies, supra note 32, at 243 (comment of Joel Greenberg) (describing how
overly specific terms might “totally put the nail in the coffin for any event [the parties]
didn’t list”).
184 Inclusivity is particularly problematic in M&A transactions, where information
asymmetry often becomes apparent only after due diligence. Choi & Triantis, supra
note 169, at 855.
185 John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without Context,
67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2018); see Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 357 (“[I]t
would be too costly for parties to create behavioral codes that courts could merely
enforce.”). But see Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms
Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 205–06 (2009) (arguing that
ambiguous contract language does not reduce drafting costs but seeks to prevent either
side from misinterpreting the terms).
186 David Cheng, Interpretation of Material Adverse Change Clauses in an Adverse
Economy, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 564, 574 (2009).
187 Juridical risk is the possibility that specific clauses or terms may be
inappropriately included or excluded in the course of litigation. Gilson & Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 354.
188 Id.; see also Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 854.
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By expressly rejecting the frustration of purpose approach to MAE
interpretation,189 the Akorn opinion confirmed that MAE clauses do have
an independent meaning after all.190 Problematically, that meaning may
not be what parties subjectively intended. The juridical risk created by
Akorn will promote narrow drafting language as parties attempt to
contract around common law materiality thresholds.191 By carving out
narrow exceptions, parties can address known risks and clearly
articulate specific intent.192
But interpreting narrow drafting
necessarily assumes that even where risks are unforeseen—or
undisclosed—the parties have some specific intent to articulate.193 At
the time of contract execution, parties might not have a specific,
subjective intent regarding whether a particular event or circumstance
would or would not be material.194 In those scenarios, tightly drafted
language designed to reflect the parties’ clear understanding can trigger
false positives or false negatives—which would precisely contradict
subjective intent.195

189 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at
*132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 10, at 807) (“‘In lieu of the
default rule that performance may be excused only where a contract’s principal purpose
is completely or nearly completely frustrated, a contract could lower this bar to an
achievable level by providing for excuse when the value of counter-performance has
“materially” . . . diminished.’ That is what the parties did in this case.”), aff’d en banc, 198
A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
190 See Emmerich & Norwitz, supra note 157, at 8.
191 West et al., supra note 168, at 2; see Leslie J. Levinson & Anna Jinhua Wang, The
Akorn Case – New Development in Delaware for Termination by Material Adverse Effect,
THE NAT’L L. REV., Feb. 6, 2019, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/akorn-casenew-development-delaware-termination-material-adverse-effect (“From a drafting
perspective, if a particular MAE the contracting parties contemplate could be quantified,
the parties should consider setting a specific metric to the definition of such MAE.”).
192 Levinson & Wang, supra note 191. For specific scenarios where a known
condition threatens the deal’s vitality before contract execution, buyers may prefer
narrow language that predetermines the impact that the condition will have on each
party. During the 2020 global coronavirus disease pandemic, for example, some public
company merger agreements explicitly addressed the parties’ respective performance
expectations. See, e.g., Grace Maral Burnett et al., Analysis: Morgan Stanley, E*Trade
Merger Excludes Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 28, 2020, https://news.bloomberg
law.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-morgan-stanley-e-trade-merger-excludescoronavirus (highlighting language which excludes any “epidemic, pandemic or disease
outbreak (including the COVID-19 virus)” from qualifying as an MAE).
193 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101.
194 Hill, supra note 185, at 216.
195 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101.
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Interpretation risk further increases given the inherently factspecific nature of MAE circumstances, where predetermined criteria
often prove arbitrary.196 Requiring parties to anticipate and address
every possible deal risk would impracticably complicate the negotiation
and drafting process.197
Moreover, because specific language
necessarily excludes broad meaning,198 narrow terms limit
extracontractual evidence, which could otherwise illuminate how the
parties would have addressed the eventual circumstances.
C. Interpretation Bias
Akorn sets a heavy burden for sellers, who must now make a strong
showing following a 20% projected loss.199 Where the anticipated
decline in equity value exceeds 20%, sellers will need to bring strong
evidence showing subjective expectations under the agreement and
why those expectations are not consistent with finding the current loss
material.200 Even where the anticipated loss does not meet the 20%
quasi-presumption, sellers will have to analogize away from
renegotiation price adjustment rates, collars, and reverse termination
fees, each of which sets a lower data point than the 20% decline found
in the Akorn opinion.201
And for all that Akorn giveth, it taketh very little away. Despite any
contrary appearances, Delaware courts did not expressly swear off the
IBP seller-friendly policy perspective. Until further opinions address
that issue, it is difficult to determine whether the Akorn deviation will
remain confined to the facts presented.202 Further, the decision did not
196 See Michelle Shenker Garrett, Efficiency and Certainty in Uncertain Times: The
Material Adverse Change Clause Revisited, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBLEMS 333, 359 (Spring
2010).
197 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 144 (Del. Ch. 2001)
(positing that narrow judicial interpretation would “encourage the negotiation of
extremely detailed ‘MAC’ clauses with numerous carve-outs or qualifiers”).
198 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 829.
199 West et al., supra note 168, at 2.
200 Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39 (suggesting that sellers projecting a
valuation loss greater than 20% “will have to explain why they believe that [Akorn]’s
quasi-bright-line . . . is off”).
201 See id.
202 The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a flood of MAE litigation that asked Delaware
courts to decide whether the pandemic constituted an MAE. For a consolidated list of
such cases, see CHANCERY BLOG, Delaware Corporate Litigation in the Time of Coronavirus,
http://chanceryblog.com/court-procedure/ (last visited June 17, 2020). As of the date
of this Comment, Delaware courts have not decided this issue but seem to acknowledge
that the circumstances may qualify. For example, in a telephonic hearing for one COVID19 MAE case, the Chancery Court withheld a ruling due to “the sheer breadth and
complexity of the legal issues” necessarily raised by MAE claims. Telephonic Rulings of
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negate the heavy burden faced by buyers who seek to avoid
performance by invoking an MAE. By deviating from the IBP “backstop”
approach,203 however, Akorn creates an opportunity to revisit the
Delaware MAE approach.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN UPDATED MAE STANDARD
Delaware courts should adopt a new MAE standard by (A)
clarifying the qualitative analysis set by the Akorn opinion and (B)
eliminating presumptive advantages. This Part argues that courts
should avoid restating common law default rules and adopt a three-part
conduct/intent standard, as well as an unbiased interpretation policy,
to reflect bargained-for contractual rights.
A. Clarify the Qualitative Analysis
When applying Akorn, Delaware courts should specify a standard
of qualitative review for when a failed bring-down condition constitutes
an MAE. This Section considers two conflicting standards: (1) an
essential failure standard and (2) a conduct/intent standard.
1. The Essential Failure Standard
Discussing how Akorn’s data integrity violations represented an
essential failure to its business operations, and how overwhelming
evidence supported Fresenius’s claim, raises a useful starting point for
a new qualitative MAE test. Delaware courts could use a context-specific
approach that analyzes all relevant circumstances to determine what
constitutes an essential failure. And in defining overwhelming evidence,
Delaware courts could specify the heavy burden framework outlined in
prior decisions as one which requires objective and subjective proof
that the essential failure is reasonably likely to result in an MAE.204 That
high evidentiary standard could help to weed out claims motivated by
buyer’s remorse. And while long-term goals would remain the
paramount indication of party intent, the buyer could demonstrate how
the failed bring-down condition had been essential to a short-term goal
or secondary purpose sought through the transaction.

the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite at 15–22, Juweel Inv’rs Ltd. v. Carlyle
Roundtrip, L.P., C.A. No. 2020-0338-JRS (Del. Ch. May 20, 2020). As of the date of this
Comment, Delaware courts have yet to posit whether the COVID-19 pandemic may
circumstantially constitute an MAE. See Verified Complaint at 4, Tiffany & Co. v. LVMH
Moët Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, et al., C.A. No. 2020-0768-JRS (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2020).
203 See Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 9.
204 For a similar MAE approach, see Genesco, Inc. v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III),
2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007).
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The dilemma with an essential failure MAE standard is that it
effectively restates the “basic assumption” standard set forth in
common law default rules.205 As the Akorn opinion points out, “[i]t is not
reasonable to conclude that sophisticated parties to merger agreements,
who expend considerable resources drafting and negotiating [MAE]
clauses, intend them to do nothing more than restate the default rule.”206
If parties intend to excuse performance only on the occurrence of an
essential failure, those parties could invoke impracticability207 or
frustration of purpose208 rather than relying on a contractual provision.
Moreover, the burden of producing overwhelming evidence to support
an MAE assertion would turn the buyer’s already heavy burden into a
Sisyphean undertaking, virtually negating bargaining power for MAE
terms. Where parties meticulously negotiate an MAE clause, applying a
common law default rule fills a nonexistent gap in contravention to
established contract law.209

205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where . . . a
party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the
circumstances indicate the contrary.”) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where . . . a party’s principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the
circumstances indicate the contrary.”) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 266(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s
principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has
no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the
contract is made, no duty of that party to render performance arises . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
206 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at
*132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 10, at 828), aff’d en banc, 198
A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
208 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
209 See 3M Co. v. Neology, Inc., No.: N18C-07-089 AML CCLD, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS
312, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019) (rejecting allegations of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the MAE clause addressed the conflict at
issue); cf. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007) (“Barring any
evidence to the contrary, courts should restrain themselves from reaching any
conclusions other than those that the parties, who are perceived to have understood the
terms of the written agreement and bargained for and negotiated the relationship
created by the contract in exchange for consideration.”). But cf. Dunlap v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005) (observing that Delaware courts have
“recognized the occasional necessity of implying contract terms to ensure the parties’
reasonable expectations are fulfilled”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Put differently, if parties intended to rely on common law default
rules, merger agreements would not need MAE clauses at all. And as
applied to bring-down conditions, an essential failure standard would
comport almost identically with those rules. For example, inaccurate
representations or warranties made by the seller that relate to the
buyer’s primary or secondary purposes for contracting, which
inaccuracies exist at contract execution, could excuse the buyer’s closing
obligations under the common law doctrine of existing frustration.210
Again, an approach that interprets MAE clauses as directly mimicking
common law default rules defeats that clause’s purpose and renders the
language—and the parties’ stringent negotiations—essentially
superfluous.
2. The Conduct/Intent Standard
Rather than relying on common law default rules, a new approach
can be extracted from the pattern seen across Delaware opinions that
carefully scrutinizes party intent to determine whether the events in
question constitute an MAE.211 Under this approach, qualitative
considerations would weigh the seller’s conduct and disclosures against
the buyer’s conduct and intentions surrounding the MAE declaration.
The conduct/intent approach would yield a new three-step test for
whether qualitative elements suggest an MAE.
This analysis would first consider the specific language chosen by
the parties to denote an MAE bring-down condition together with the
context of the agreement. Where parties disagree as to materiality
qualifiers or carveout language, the court should view the terms in the
context of the language finalized elsewhere in the parties’ agreement.212
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The ability
to consider foreseeable events does not negate this comparison because foreseeability
relates only to post-signing developments. For inaccuracies existing at the time of
contract execution, a separate standard is necessary because “one cannot go back in time
to fix a representation made as of a date in the past” and thus negate the buyer’s MAE
declaration. See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB,
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *70 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
211 See Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *152–66 (analyzing buyer’s conduct
throughout the transaction); Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d
715, 722 (Del. Ch. 2008) (viewing buyer’s conduct negatively where such conduct
deviated from the parties’ professed intent); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502,
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *109–19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (considering conduct by both
parties which contributed to deal failure); In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods,
789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (suggesting throughout that the court did not believe, due
to Tyson’s conduct, that Tyson believed IBP had sustained an MAE).
212 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 741 (“It is a maxim of contract law that, given ambiguity
between potentially conflicting terms, a contract should be read so as not to render any
term meaningless.”).
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Next, the court would inquire as to whether the seller materially
deviated from its represented or warranted condition.213 Expert
opinions, and the credibility underlying such reports, would receive
close scrutiny to ensure that the materiality finding reflects the seller’s
accurate financial and operational status.214 And because the Akorn
analysis factored post-trial events into its findings, the actual outcome
of the seller’s deviations or omissions would likely factor into a
materiality finding.215 Finally, the court would analyze the objective
reasonableness of the buyer’s belief that the target company had
sustained an MAE as well as subjective evidence supporting or
undermining that belief.216 Crucial to this analysis would be evidence
showing the buyer’s subjective beliefs throughout the transactional
timeline, including the motivating factors for the MAE declaration and
any surrounding circumstances which would detract from that
assertion.217
The conduct/intent standard avoids the problematic application of
common law default rules. The analysis ensures that, under the
appropriate circumstances, buyers can benefit from their heavily
negotiated MAE clauses. Simultaneously, this approach fends off
buyer’s remorse where the declarations appear pretextual or
213 A material deviation from a representation or warranty “alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of
information made available” to a reasonable buyer. Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394,
at *42–43 (quoting Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *86). This standard is analytically
distinct from the “long-term earnings potential” standard applicable to MAE assertions.
Id. at *43.
214 This is not to suggest that expert reports are not already subjected to high
scrutiny. Rather, expert reports can demonstrate whether the party submitting that
report intended the opinion to accurately reflect the financial and operational
conditions when the MAE was declared. See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 727 (holding insolvency
opinion, prepared in anticipation of litigation, unreliable for actual valuation estimates).
For a post-Akorn MAE opinion applying this approach, see Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS
1394, at *86–94.
215 See Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *77–78 (finding buyer’s MAE prediction
unreasonable where the anticipated events did not occur).
216 At least one post-Akorn decision has found no MAE where the buyer’s belief was
not objectively reasonable in light of the transactional circumstances. Id. at *85.
217 This analysis is distinguishable from a common law implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing analysis. To invoke the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
a party must demonstrate a gap in the agreement’s express terms. See, e.g., Vintage
Rodeo Parent v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 2018-0927-SG, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *62
(Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 2019) (“What the Plaintiffs ultimately seek is equitable fairness, which
is not promised by the implied covenant.”). Where a contractual provision defines an
MAE and establishes specific conditions precedent, the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing provides no additional deal protection. See 3M Co. v. Neology, Inc., No.
N18C-07-089 AML CCLD, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 312, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019).
Rather, a conduct analysis mirrors the established inquiry as to the parties’ conformity
with contractual expectations. See supra text accompanying note 211.
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inconsistent with party conduct. Determining materiality through
conduct and intent, as well as plain contract language, returns the focus
to what the parties understood the contract to mean. That focus should
be prominent and primary throughout MAE interpretation because, as
IBP reiterates, effectuating the parties’ intentions is the objective of
judicial review of private agreements.218
B. Eliminate Presumptive Advantages
A party-neutral standard that expands on Akorn’s qualitative
analysis could avoid numeric presumptions and also prevent Delaware
courts from massacring future MAE claims. Biased interpretation
standards effectively rewrite contract language where parties set
intentionally vague terms.219 And granting either party an inherent
advantage goes against the contractarian theory that Delaware courts
stringently respect.220
The solution to MAE interpretation is not to evenly distribute
interpretation bias, but to eliminate bias altogether. Rather than
approaching MAE assertions as presumptively motivated by buyer’s
remorse, Delaware courts should recognize MAE claims for what they
are: one party’s assertion of a bargained-for contractual right.221 Such
recognition demands the abandonment of the seller-friendly policy.
Simultaneously, future opinions should acknowledge that the numeric
benchmark outlined in the Akorn opinion, while illustrative of what may
constitute materiality, cannot itself be dispositive.222 By moving away
from the seller-friendly policy and expressly disclaiming the percentage
thresholds, Delaware courts can move toward a genuinely contractarian
MAE interpretation standard.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Akorn decision shows that Delaware courts are, in fact, capable
of permitting a buyer to back out after a failed bring-down condition is
proven likely to cause an MAE. Though not expressly abandoning the
seller-friendly policy, this opinion serves as a helpful starting point for
reevaluating how Delaware courts approach MAE claims. To better
reflect the purpose of judicial review, future opinions should cautiously
218

IBP, 789 A.2d at 55.
See Hill, supra note 185, at 216.
220 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101–02.
221 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 106–07.
222 Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (“Any approach that designates
a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding
such as materiality, must necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.”).
219
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apply Akorn to shift the Delaware MAE standard toward an approach
which carefully considers whether, as evidenced through conduct and
intent, the parties would reasonably have expected the development to
constitute an MAE and waive the buyer’s obligation to close. That
conduct/intent approach would ensure that bring-down conditions, and
failure to comply therewith, grant protection for buyers with justifiable
remorse.

